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Section 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Arrest or detention

Section 10 protects people on arrest or detention. It guarantees prompt reasons, access to legal counsel without delay, and the ability to challenge the legality of detention through habeas corpus. The excerpts explain when these rights arise, the duties they impose, and their limits.

10: Arrest or detention

Everyone has the right on arrest or detention

(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;

(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and

(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

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The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 10.

When the rights arise

In summary, we conclude as follows: 1. Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical or psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply. 2. In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it may not be clear whether a person has been detained. To determine whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following factors: (a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police were providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out the individual for focussed investigation. (b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the use of physical contact; the place where the interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the duration of the encounter. (c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual where relevant, including age; physical stature; minority status; level of sophistication.

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10(a): Reasons for detention

When considering whether there has been a breach of s. 10 (a) of the Charter , it is the substance of what the accused can reasonably be supposed to have understood, rather than the formalism of the precise words used, which must govern.

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10(b): Access to counsel

This Court has said on numerous previous occasions that s. 10 (b) of the Charter imposes the following duties on state authorities who arrest or detain a person: (1) to inform the detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of legal aid and duty counsel; (2) if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right (except in urgent and dangerous circumstances); and (3) to refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until he or she has had that reasonable opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or danger).

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To allow for a delay between the outset of a detention and the engagement of the police duties under s. 10 (b) creates an ill‑defined and unworkable test of the application of the s. 10 (b) right. The right to counsel requires a stable and predictable definition. What constitutes a permissible delay is abstract and difficult to quantify, whereas the concept of immediacy leaves little room for misunderstanding. An ill‑defined threshold for the application of the right to counsel must be avoided, particularly as it relates to a right that imposes specific obligations on the police. In our view, the words “without delay” mean “immediately” for the purposes of s. 10 (b). Subject to concerns for officer or public safety, and such limitations as prescribed by law and justified under s. 1 of the Charter , the police have a duty to inform a detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel, and a duty to facilitate that right immediately upon detention.

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An individual who enters a hospital to receive medical treatment is not in a Charter -free zone. Where the individual has requested access to counsel and is in custody at the hospital, the police have an obligation under s. 10 (b) to take steps to ascertain whether private access to a phone is in fact available, given the circumstances. Since most hospitals have phones, it is not a question simply of whether the individual is in the emergency room, it is whether the Crown has demonstrated that the circumstances are such that a private phone conversation is not reasonably feasible.

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We conclude that s. 10(b) does not mandate the presence of defence counsel throughout a custodial interrogation. We further conclude that in most cases, an initial warning, coupled with a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel when the detainee invokes the right, satisfies s. 10(b). However, the police must give the detainee an additional opportunity to receive advice from counsel where developments in the course of the investigation make this necessary to serve the purpose underlying s. 10(b) of providing the detainee with legal advice relevant to his right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not. To date, this principle has led to the recognition of the right to a second consultation with a lawyer where changed circumstances result from: new procedures involving the detainee; a change in the jeopardy facing the detainee; or reason to believe that the first information provided was deficient. The categories are not closed.

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The degree of imbalance between police and detainee will of course vary from case to case, depending on the particular circumstances of the detainees themselves. Specific characteristics of individual detainees (described as “vulnerabilities” in the context of police interrogation) can influence the course of custodial interviews. Investigating officers and reviewing courts must be alive to the possibility that these vulnerabilities, which may relate to gender, youth, age, race, mental health, language comprehension, cognitive capacity or other considerations, coupled with developments that may occur in the course of police interrogation, will have rendered a detainee’s initial legal advice inadequate, impairing his or her ability to make an informed choice about whether to cooperate with the police. In such situations, Sinclair requires that an accused is entitled to an additional consultation to even the playing field.

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This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the test for valid waiver of the Charter right to counsel under s. 10 (b) and has indicated that the standard required for such a waiver is very high (see, for example, R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236; Clarkson v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383; R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; and R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869). According to Lamer C.J., “a person who waives a right must know what he or she is giving up if the waiver is to be valid” (Prosper, at p. 275, citing R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173).

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Stops to provide breath samples are meant to be brief. Drivers stopped for this purpose are then being detained. This Court’s jurisprudence allows a limit on the right to counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during such detention. This limit is justified under s. 1 of the Charter, because s. 254(2)(b) Cr. C. reflects the balance struck by Parliament between the safeguarding of drivers’ constitutional rights and the public interest in eradicating impaired driving (Woods, at para. 29). It is essential to this balance that the word “forthwith” be interpreted in a manner generally consistent with its usual or ordinary meaning.

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10(c): Habeas corpus

To be successful, an application for habeas corpus must satisfy the following criteria. First, the applicant must establish that he or she has been deprived of liberty. Once a deprivation of liberty is proven, the applicant must raise a legitimate ground upon which to question its legality. If the applicant has raised such a ground, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities to show that the deprivation of liberty was lawful (Farbey, Sharpe and Atrill, at pp. 84-85; May, at paras. 71 and 74).

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In sum, the Peiroo exception can be more clearly articulated as follows: an application for habeas corpus will be precluded only when a complete, comprehensive and expert scheme provides for review that is at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the challenges raised by the habeas corpus application. An administrative scheme may be sufficient to safeguard the interests protected by habeas corpus with respect to some types of challenges, but may also need to be re-examined with respect to others. It is thus essential to consider how the challenge to the unlawful detention is framed in the habeas corpus application.

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To summarize, the decision to increase a security classification is a deprivation of liberty, as is the decision to deny a lower security classification. However, in both situations, access to habeas corpus will still require an applicant to raise a legitimate ground for the unlawfulness of that particular decision. What amounts to legitimate grounds must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As discussed above, at the second stage, an applicant must raise a legitimate ground to question the lawfulness of the denial of a lower security classification because it was either procedurally unfair, unreasonable, outside the decision maker’s jurisdiction, failed to comply with the Charter, or a combination of these reasons. Failure to raise a legitimate ground at the second stage will result in the dismissal of the habeas corpus application. This requirement ensures that only claims with a sound legal foundation proceed to the merits, thereby preventing misuse of the writ.

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