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Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Democratic rights of citizens

Section 3 protects Canadian citizens’ rights to vote and to stand for election to the House of Commons and provincial legislative assemblies. Section 30 extends references to provinces and legislative assemblies to the territories. The right includes meaningful participation and effective representation; it does not extend to municipal elections. Restrictions on the right must be assessed under section 1.

3: Democratic rights of citizens

Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

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The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 3.

Scope and participation

Section 3 guarantees citizens the right to vote and run for office in provincial and federal elections, and includes a right to effective representation. The text of s. 3 makes clear, however, that it guarantees “only the right to vote in elections of representatives of the federal and the provincial legislative assemblies” (Haig, at p. 1031 (emphasis added)) and “does not extend to municipal elections” (p. 1031 (emphasis added), citing P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed. 1992), vol. 2, at p. 42‑2). Simply put, ss. 2(b) and 3 record distinct rights which must be given independent meaning (Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at paras. 79‑80; Harper, at para. 67). Effective representation is not a principle of s. 2(b), nor can the concept be imported wholesale from a different Charter right.

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In the final analysis, I believe that the Court was correct in Haig, supra, to define s. 3 with reference to the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. Democracy, of course, is a form of government in which sovereign power resides in the people as a whole. In our system of democracy, this means that each citizen must have a genuine opportunity to take part in the governance of the country through participation in the selection of elected representatives. The fundamental purpose of s. 3, in my view, is to promote and protect the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the political life of the country. Absent such a right, ours would not be a true democracy.

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It follows that a broad and purposive interpretation of s. 3 does not allow for residence to operate as an internal limit on the right to vote. As this Court held in Sauvé #2, the ambit of the s. 3 right to vote “should not be limited by countervailing collective concerns . . . These concerns are for the government to raise under s. 1 in justifying the limits it has imposed on the right” (para. 11). This does not of course foreclose the possibility that an infringement of the right to vote could be justified in the context of a reasonable limits analysis or that legislative restrictions on the right to vote are necessarily unconstitutional. What it does mean, however, is that limits on the right to vote must, if raised, be justified under s. 1, and not indirectly incorporated into the scope of the right itself. Accordingly, residence is not an essential requirement of the right to vote; rather, it is a countervailing consideration which must be justified by the AGC under s. 1 of the Charter.

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In interpreting the right to vote under s. 3 this Court, and Canadian courts in general, have taken the approach that the justification for limitations on the right must be grounded in s. 1 of the Charter . As I have earlier noted, I do not believe the wording in the second part of s. 3 justifies taking a different approach to the right to stand for election and become a member of Parliament or a legislative assembly. This is in accord with this Court’s well established approach of reading Charter rights broadly and putting the burden of justifying limitations upon the state.

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Effective representation

It is my conclusion that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to "effective representation". Ours is a representative democracy. Each citizen is entitled to be represented in government. Representation comprehends the idea of having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea of the right to bring one's grievances and concerns to the attention of one's government representative; as noted in Dixon v. B.C. (A.G.), [1989] 4 W.W.R. 393, at p. 413, elected representatives function in two roles -- legislative and what has been termed the "ombudsman role". What are the conditions of effective representation? The first is relative parity of voting power.

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It emerges therefore that deviations from absolute voter parity may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or the provision of more effective representation. Beyond this, dilution of one citizen's vote as compared with another's should not be countenanced.

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The constitutional settlement effected by the inclusion of s. 3 in the Charter is a limited one: every Canadian citizen has the right to vote in federal and provincial elections. The right to vote is, at its heart, a right to participate in choosing a community’s representative in Parliament or a provincial legislature by casting a ballot – a right to participate in a democratic electoral process. It does not entail a right to be represented by a candidate or party of one’s choice, or a right to have that candidate or party share in the political decision-making authority that flows from forming government. This occasions no hardship to those whose preferred candidates or parties do not succeed in elections. As the application judge notes, it is foundational to the democratic constitutional order that Members of Parliament are responsible for representing their entire constituencies – those who voted against them as well as those who supported them.

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Electoral competition and information

It is thus my conclusion that s. 3 imposes on Parliament an obligation not to enhance the capacity of one citizen to participate in the electoral process in a manner that compromises another citizen’s parallel right to meaningful participation in the electoral process. Where legislation extends a benefit to some citizens, but not to others, it is necessary to consider carefully the impact of that legislation on the citizens who have not received the benefit. If the legislation interferes with the right of certain citizens to play a meaningful role in the social discourse and dialogue that the electoral process engenders, it is inconsistent with s. 3 of the Charter.

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This Court’s jurisprudence is clear that s. 3 does not require that all participants in the electoral system be treated equally. However, s. 3 will be infringed if spending limits allow any political actor or third party a disproportionate voice in the political discourse given their role in the electoral process, thus depriving voters of a broad range of views and perspectives on social and political issues.

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