Browse Charter sections

Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Fundamental freedoms

The text of Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms appears below, followed by excerpts from selected cases discussing this provision.

2: Fundamental freedoms

Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(a) freedom of conscience and religion;

(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;

(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and

(d) freedom of association.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 2.

Expression and the press

[38] In sum, to determine whether an expressive activity is protected by the Charter, we must answer three questions: (1) Does the activity in question have expressive content, thereby bringing it, prima facie, within the scope of s. 2(b) protection? (2) Is the activity excluded from that protection as a result of either the location or the method of expression? (3) If the activity is protected, does an infringement of the protected right result from either the purpose or the effect of the government action? (Criminal Lawyers’ Association, at para. 32, summarizing the test developed in City of Montréal, at para. 56).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

Association

[5] In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, Bastarache J. for a majority of this Court set out a two-step framework for evaluating alleged infringements of freedom of association. First, a court considers whether activities fall within the range of activities protected under the freedom of association guarantee. Second, the court determines whether the legislation or government action, in purpose or effect, substantially interferes with those activities (paras. 13 and 25).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

[37] It may be harder for a claimant to meet their burden of proof when challenging underinclusive legislation or when seeking state intervention since, as noted above, the effects of underinclusive legislation can be hard to disentangle from other factors. As this Court noted in Dunmore, it will be in “unique contexts” that underinclusive legislation amounts to substantial interference (para. 22). In all cases, however, the threshold to establish an infringement of s. 2(d) remains substantial interference. A claimant alleging that underinclusive legislation infringes s. 2(d) need not meet an elevated threshold.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

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