Section 33 lays down requirements of form only, and there is no warrant for importing into it grounds for substantive review of the legislative policy in exercising the override authority in a particular case.
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The essential requirement of form laid down by s. 33 is that the override declaration must be an express declaration that an Act or a provision of an Act shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in s. 2 or ss. 7 to 15 of the Charter. With great respect for the contrary view, this Court is of the opinion that a s. 33 declaration is sufficiently express if it refers to the number of the section, subsection or paragraph of the Charter which contains the provision or provisions to be overridden. Of course, if it is intended to override only a part of the provision or provisions contained in a section, subsection or paragraph then there would have to be a sufficient reference in words to the part to be overridden.
Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Exception where express declaration
Section 33 permits Parliament or a provincial legislature to expressly override section 2 or sections 7–15 for up to five years, with re-enactment permitted. These passages address declaration requirements, prospective effect, rights outside the override and differing appellate approaches to declaratory relief. The scope of declaratory review remains contested in appeals before the Supreme Court.
33: Exception where express declaration
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2): Operation of exception
An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3): Five year limitation
A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration.
(4): Re-enactment
Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under subsection (1).
(5): Five year limitation
Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 33.
Declaration requirements and effect
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Where, as here, an enabling provision is ambiguous as to whether it allows for retroactive legislation, the same rule of construction applies. In this case, s. 33(1) admits of two interpretations; one that allows Parliament or a legislature to enact retroactive override provisions, the other that permits prospective derogation only. We conclude that the latter and narrower interpretation is the proper one, and that s. 7 cannot give retrospective effect to the override provision. Section 7 of An Act respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, is to the extent of this inconsistency with s. 33 of the Canadian Charter, of no force or effect, with the result that the standard override provisions enacted by s. 1 of that Act came into force on June 23, 1982 in accordance with the first paragraph of s. 7.
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Rights outside the override
As discussed, the broad objective of the Charter is to promote individual freedom from state restraint or coercion. Section 6, like the democratic rights in ss. 3 to 5 of the Charter, is not subject to legislative override under s. 33. Thus, s. 6’s mobility rights are foundational to our society, and “[a] broad and purposive interpretation of the right is particularly critical” (Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 11; see also Divito, at para. 28). Against this backdrop, we turn to the scope of the guarantees in s. 6.
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Declaratory relief: differing appellate approaches
Except as regards its own conditions of application, s. 33 thus operates as a kind of “constitutional privative clause” (“disposition d’inattaquabilité constitutionnelle”) that limits the judicial review protected by s. 96 of the CA 1867. The power of the courts to review the exercise of the legislature’s authority, a power guaranteed by s. 96 of the CA 1867, is thereby limited to the sole issue of determining whether the requirements for invoking s. 33 of the Canadian Charter have been satisfied, which, as we saw earlier, makes it possible to reconcile these two provisions and have them coexist. The courts, therefore, cannot be asked to perform the judicial review the parties opposed to the Act are seeking in the case at bar, nor can they be asked to make a judicial declaration in that regard.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
A s. 33 declaration does not repeal the Charter provisions in question or change their content. The Charter remains in effect. The judge did not err in holding that the declaration contained in s. 197.4 of the Education Act, made under s. 33 of the Charter, did not oust the jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench to determine whether that provision limits the rights of individuals under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.
Whether it is appropriate to determine that issue is another matter and one that is beyond the scope of this appeal. In this regard, as the judge held, the grant of declaratory relief remains in the discretion of the Court. Accordingly, these reasons do not address whether it is appropriate to grant declaratory relief in the circumstances of this case.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
