Based on the proper interpretation of s. 23(2) , which we will set out in detail below, we are of the view that in order to comply with this constitutional provision, the CFL’s “major part” requirement must involve a qualitative rather than a strict quantitative assessment of the child’s educational experience through which it is determined if a significant part, though not necessarily the majority, of his or her instruction, considered cumulatively, was in the minority language. Indeed, the past and present educational experience of the child is the best indicator of genuine commitment to a minority language education.
Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Language of instruction
Section 23 guarantees minority-language primary and secondary education to qualifying Canadian citizens for their children, where numbers warrant. It protects educational continuity, appropriate services and minority management. Paragraph 23(1)(a), based on a parent’s first language learned and still understood, is not in force in Quebec.
23: Language of instruction
(1) Citizens of Canada
(a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they reside, or
(b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in English or French and reside in a province where the language in which they received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province,
have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in that language in that province.
(2): Continuity of language instruction
Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same language.
(3): Application where numbers warrant
The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of a province
(a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them out of public funds of minority language instruction; and
(b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the right to have them receive that instruction in minority language educational facilities provided out of public funds.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 23.
Eligibility and admission
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If an entire portion of the educational pathway is omitted from the analysis because of the nature or origin of the instruction received, it is impossible to conduct the global analysis of the child’s situation and educational pathway required by Solski.
[…]
The “bridging” schools appear in some instances to be institutions created for the sole purpose of artificially qualifying children for admission to the publicly funded English-language school system. When schools are established primarily to bring about the transfer of ineligible students to the publicly funded English-language system, and the instruction they give in fact serves that end, it cannot be said that the resulting educational pathway is genuine. However, it is necessary to review the situation of each institution, as well as the nature of its clientele and the conduct of individual clients.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
In this case, however, the Yukon has not delegated the function of setting admission criteria for children of non-rights holders to the Board. In the absence of any such delegation, there is no authority for the Board to unilaterally set admission criteria which are different from what is set out in the Regulation. This does not preclude the Board from claiming that the Yukon has insufficiently ensured compliance with s. 23 , and nothing stops the Board from arguing that the Yukon’s approach to admissions prevents the realization of s. 23 ’s purpose: see Mahe, at pp. 362-65. But that is a different issue from whether the Board has, in the absence of delegation from the Yukon, the unilateral right to decide to admit children other than those who are covered by s. 23 or the Regulation.
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I pause here to make two important clarifications. Stating that the Minister did not proportionately balance the values underlying s. 23 of the Charter with the government’s interests in this case does not amount to imposing an obligation on decision makers in her position to admit all children of non‑rights holder parents. A refusal does not always mean that there was a disproportionate balancing of the relevant values and the government’s interests. Nor does this amount to endorsing freedom of choice of the language of instruction, a model expressly rejected by the framers under s. 23 (Solski, at para. 8; Nguyen, at paras. 35‑36). On the contrary, the freedom of choice model would imply the systematic admission of children of non‑rights holder parents without a proportionate balancing of Charter values. In each case, the decision maker must consider the relevant values in light of the particular circumstances of the application in order to decide whether to admit children of non‑rights holder parents.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
Services, quality and governance
In sum, a court that is asked to situate a given number of students on the sliding scale must proceed as follows. The first step is to identify the relevant number of students. To do so, the court must consider the number of students who will eventually avail themselves of the service. At the second step, the court must compare that number with the numbers of students in majority language schools across the province in order to determine what is appropriate from the standpoint of pedagogy and cost. The existence of comparably sized majority language schools, regardless of where they are located in the province, supports a presumption that the province considers maintaining those smaller schools to be appropriate from the standpoint of pedagogy and cost. The province can rebut this presumption by showing that the majority language comparator schools identified by the claimants are not appropriate comparators or that the school proposed by the minority is inappropriate from the standpoint of pedagogy or cost.
[…]
Once the court has completed a province-wide comparison — where such a comparison is necessary — it moves on to the third step: determining what level of services is appropriate. Where the number of minority language students in question is comparable to the numbers of students attending majority language schools, regardless of where those schools are located in the province (provided of course that the government has not shown that the choice of comparator schools or the proposed service is inappropriate from the standpoint of pedagogy or cost), the number of minority language students falls at the high end of the sliding scale and warrants a homogeneous school.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
When assessing equivalence, a purposive approach requires a court to consider the educational choices available from the perspective of s. 23 rights holders. Would reasonable rights-holder parents be deterred from sending their children to a minority language school because it is meaningfully inferior to an available majority language school?
[…]
Thus, the comparative exercise is contextual and holistic, accounting for not only physical facilities, but also quality of instruction, educational outcomes, extracurricular activities, and travel times, to name a few factors.
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In my view, children of s. 23 rights holders must receive an educational experience that is substantively equivalent to the experience provided to the majority, regardless of the size of the school or program in question. The substantive equivalence test applies everywhere on the sliding scale. The Rose‑des‑vents approach must, however, be applied in light of the specific context of official language minority schools that are not comparable in size to nearby majority language schools.
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Perhaps the most important point to stress is that completely separate school boards are not necessarily the best means of fulfilling the purpose of s. 23. What is essential, however, to satisfy that purpose is that the minority language group have control over those aspects of education which pertain to or have an effect upon their language and culture. This degree of control can be achieved to a substantial extent by guaranteeing representation of the minority on a shared school board and by giving these representatives exclusive control over all of the aspects of minority education which pertain to linguistic and cultural concerns.
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Implementation and limits
Another distinctive feature of the right in s. 23 is that the “numbers warrant” requirement leaves minority language education rights particularly vulnerable to government delay or inaction. For every school year that governments do not meet their obligations under s. 23 , there is an increased likelihood of assimilation which carries the risk that numbers might cease to “warrant”. Thus, particular entitlements afforded under s. 23 can be suspended, for so long as the numbers cease to warrant, by the very cultural erosion against which s. 23 was designed to guard. In practical, though not legal, terms, such suspensions may well be permanent. If delay is tolerated, governments could potentially avoid the duties imposed upon them by s. 23 through their own failure to implement the rights vigilantly.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that s. 23 is one of the Charter provisions whose infringement is especially difficult to justify. I conclude that any intrusions on s. 23 must therefore be analyzed and justified on the basis of a very stringent standard.
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The trial judge found at the proportionality stage that the savings resulting from the infringements of s. 23 represented a salutary effect in the sense contemplated in Oakes. I cannot agree with that finding. Savings that result from an infringement of s. 23 cannot serve to justify the infringement. Such reasoning obscures the very purpose of s. 23, which is to protect the minority from effects deleterious to it that are caused by budgetary choices of the majority. Cost savings linked to an infringement of s. 23 cannot be considered a relevant factor in the balancing of the salutary and deleterious effects of the infringing measure.
Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.
