Browse Charter sections

Section 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms

Section 24 provides remedies for infringements of Charter rights. Subsection (1) authorizes appropriate and just remedies from a court of competent jurisdiction; subsection (2) governs exclusion of evidence obtained in a manner that infringed Charter rights.

24: Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms

(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

(2): Exclusion of evidence bringing administration of justice into disrepute

Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

The following selected judicial passages discuss Section 24.

Access and remedial powers

Indeed, the focus when it comes to standing is on the allegations made by the person seeking a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter . These allegations must set out the essential elements that will have to be shown in order to establish an infringement of at least one of the applicant’s Charter rights. If they do so, the applicant will have standing to apply for a remedy under s. 24(1).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

To make this determination, the first question is whether the administrative tribunal has jurisdiction, explicit or implied, to decide questions of law. If it does, and unless it is clearly demonstrated that the legislature intended to exclude the Charter from the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction and can consider and apply the Charter — and Charter remedies — when resolving the matters properly before it.

Once the threshold question has been resolved in favour of Charter jurisdiction, the remaining question is whether the tribunal can grant the particular remedy sought, given the relevant statutory scheme. Answering this question is necessarily an exercise in discerning legislative intent. On this approach, what will always be at issue is whether the remedy sought is the kind of remedy that the legislature intended would fit within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal. Relevant considerations in discerning legislative intent will include those that have guided the courts in past cases, such as the tribunal’s statutory mandate, structure and function (Dunedin).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

First, an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances of a Charter claim is one that meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimants.

[…]

Second, an appropriate and just remedy must employ means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy.

[…]

Third, an appropriate and just remedy is a judicial one which vindicates the right while invoking the function and powers of a court. It will not be appropriate for a court to leap into the kinds of decisions and functions for which its design and expertise are manifestly unsuited.

[…]

Fourth, an appropriate and just remedy is one that, after ensuring that the right of the claimant is fully vindicated, is also fair to the party against whom the order is made. The remedy should not impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the right.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

Instead, before ordering a s. 24(1) remedy, this Court’s decisions require “proof of ‘probable future harm’” (G. (J.), at para. 51, quoting Operation Dismantle, at p. 458; United States of America v. Kwok, 2001 SCC 18, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532, at para. 66). There is only one standard of proof for establishing prior, ongoing, and future Charter breaches: the balance of probabilities.

[…]

A s. 24(1) remedial analysis should also consider the anticipated nature of the rights infringement. It may be more appropriate to order a remedy to prevent the probable future Charter infringement rather than a remedy that seeks to compensate the claimant. The s. 11(b) context is illustrative. The remedy for a breach of s. 11(b) that has already occurred has been a stay of proceedings, since any lesser remedy would allow the trial to continue and thus increase the unreasonable delay.[3] But when the court determines that, without intervention, the claimant’s s. 11(b) right will probably be infringed, the same imperative for a stay does not apply. In this circumstance, the court will prefer to order a remedy short of a stay — one that will expedite the proceedings and so prevent the Charter-infringing unreasonable delay from coming to pass.

[…]

[3] In saying this, I take no position on the appropriate remedy for a breach of s. 11(b) that occurs after a conviction is entered, but before sentencing (see Jordan, at para. 49, fn. 2).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

Remedies and limits

I conclude that damages may be awarded for Charter breach under s. 24(1) where appropriate and just. The first step in the inquiry is to establish that a Charter right has been breached. The second step is to show why damages are a just and appropriate remedy, having regard to whether they would fulfill one or more of the related functions of compensation, vindication of the right, and/or deterrence of future breaches. At the third step, the state has the opportunity to demonstrate, if it can, that countervailing factors defeat the functional considerations that support a damage award and render damages inappropriate or unjust. The final step is to assess the quantum of the damages.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

Thus, we would clarify that “clearly wrong” reflects an objective assessment into whether the legislation was clearly unconstitutional at the time it was enacted, and that bad faith and abuse of power remain part of the threshold. To that extent we would restate the Mackin threshold relating to the enactment of legislation later found to be unconstitutional: the good governance defence will prevail unless the law was clearly unconstitutional, in bad faith or an abuse of power. The exacting nature of the threshold means that an applicant’s failure to provide detailed particulars will be fatal to their claim at the pleadings stage (Henry (2015), at para. 43). Bald or vague assertions will necessarily fall short.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

To the extent that Demers reads Schachter as setting out a hard‑and‑fast rule against combining s. 24(1) and s. 52(1) remedies, it misreads that case. As I will explain, s. 24(1) is too flexible to be restricted in this way. As other jurisprudence of this Court suggests, individual exemptions from suspensions will often be an “appropriate and just” remedy when an individual claimant has braved the storm of constitutional litigation and obtained a declaration whose benefit “enures to society at large” (Demers, at para. 99, per LeBel J.). On the other hand, where an exemption would undermine the rationale for the suspension, this will be a strong countervailing factor against granting an exemption.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

The test used to determine whether a stay of proceedings is warranted is the same for both categories and consists of three requirements: (1) There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome” (Regan, at para. 54); (2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and (3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps (1) and (2), the court is required to balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits” (ibid., at para. 57).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

Thus, a trial judge should only exclude evidence for late disclosure in exceptional cases: (a) where the late disclosure renders the trial process unfair and this unfairness cannot be remedied through an adjournment and disclosure order or (b) where exclusion is necessary to maintain the integrity of the justice system. Because the exclusion of evidence impacts on trial fairness from society’s perspective insofar as it impairs the truth-seeking function of trials, where a trial judge can fashion an appropriate remedy for late disclosure that does not deny procedural fairness to the accused and where admission of the evidence does not otherwise compromise the integrity of the justice system, it will not be appropriate and just to exclude evidence under s. 24(1) .

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

Exclusion of evidence

The phrase “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” must be understood in the long‑term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. Exclusion of evidence resulting in an acquittal may provoke immediate criticism. But s. 24(2) does not focus on immediate reaction to the individual case. Rather, it looks to whether the overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the long term, will be adversely affected by admission of the evidence. The inquiry is objective. It asks whether a reasonable person, informed of all relevant circumstances and the values underlying the Charter , would conclude that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

4. The connection between the Charter breach and the impugned evidence can be “temporal, contextual, causal or a combination of the three” (Wittwer, at para. 21, quoting R. v. Plaha (2004), 189 O.A.C. 376, at para. 45). A causal connection is not required (Wittwer, at para. 21; R. v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 689, at para. 83; Strachan, at pp. 1000-1002). 5. A remote or tenuous connection between the Charter breach and the impugned evidence will not suffice to trigger s. 24(2) (Mack, at para. 38; Wittwer, at para. 21; R. v. Goldhart, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 463, at para. 40; Strachan, at pp. 1005-6). Such situations should be dealt with on a case by case basis. There is “no hard and fast rule for determining when evidence obtained following the infringement of a Charter right becomes too remote” (Strachan, at p. 1006).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

When faced with an application for exclusion under s. 24(2), a court must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society’s confidence in the justice system having regard to: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused (admission may send the message that individual rights count for little), and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. The court’s role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

But an absence of bad faith does not equate to a positive finding of good faith and the officers were not acting in “good faith” simply because they were not engaged in racial profiling. Rather, for state misconduct to be excused as a “good faith” (and, therefore, minor) infringement of Charter rights, the state must show that the police “conducted themselves in [a] manner . . . consistent with what they subjectively, reasonably, and non-negligently believe[d] to be the law” (R. v. Washington, 2007 BCCA 540, 248 B.C.A.C. 65, at para. 78).

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

The foregoing is meant to offer guidance in specific situations. A “consequential” breach is not a new “type” of Charter breach. It will not be necessary or useful in every case to determine whether the sequence of state conduct presents a “consequential” breach. But this operates as guidance for cases where an arrest follows as a consequence of a search, and both are viewed as unlawful on judicial review. In these cases, the court must assess the seriousness of both the search and the arrest. The arrest, given that it is expected in the circumstances, is unlikely to significantly increase the overall seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, but it will often result in a more significant impact on the individual’s Charter-protected interests. In this way, the s. 24(2) analysis does not become a rule of automatic exclusion, while at the same time, the court takes fully into account the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the accused.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

But it is also possible that serious Charter-infringing conduct, even when coupled with a weak impact on the Charter-protected interest, will on its own support a finding that admission of tainted evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the sum, and not the average, of those first two lines of inquiry that determines the pull towards exclusion.

[…]

Where the first and second inquiries, taken together, make a strong case for exclusion, the third inquiry will seldom if ever tip the balance in favour of admissibility (Paterson, at para. 56). Conversely, if the first two inquiries together reveal weaker support for exclusion of the evidence, the third inquiry will most often confirm that the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

As Cronk J.A. put it, allowing the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence to overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis “would deprive those charged with serious crimes of the protection of the individual freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in effect, declare that in the administration of the criminal law ‘the ends justify the means’” (para. 150). Charter protections must be construed so as to apply to everyone, even those alleged to have committed the most serious criminal offences. In relying on Puskas in these circumstances, the trial judge seemed to imply that where the evidence is reliable and the charge is serious, admission will always be the result. As Grant makes clear, this is not the law.

Unofficial text. Always verify quotes against official sources.

The best tool for reading complex documents. Use Eno free: no credit card, no subscription.